State led credit and savings programs have been implemented in numerous low income countries, but their success in reaching the poor remains widely debated. We report on research which exploits the policy features of the Indian social banking program to provide evidence on this issue. State-led branch expansion into rural unbanked locations reduced poverty across Indian states. In addition, the enforcement of directed bank lending requirements was associated with increased bank borrowing among the poor, in particular low caste and tribal groups.
Introduction
The poor are less likely to avail of banking facilities. Over 35% of low income households in the US do not have a bank account (as against a national average of 10%, Washington (2004) ). These …gures are typically much higher in low income countries - Paulson and McAndrews (1999) report that, relative to a national mean of 50%, 73% of low income South African households are without bank accounts. Within low income countries, the group most likely to be excluded from the banking sector is the rural poor.
A belief that the welfare costs of exclusion from the banking sector, especially for the rural poor, are high has led to widespread government intervention in the banking sector of low income countries (Besley 1995) .
Examples of such interventions range from interest rate ceilings on lending to the poor to state-led branch expansion in rural areas. However, whether such interventions actually improve the access of the poor to banks, help alleviate poverty, or both, remains widely debated (see Adams et al 1984) .
Between bank nationalization in 1969 and the onset of …nancial liberalization in 1990, government regulation of the banking sector in India sought to a¤ect bank location and lending practices so as to favor the poor. This paper summarizes results from two studies based on the Indian social banking experiment Wong 2004 ). We use state-level data to show that rural branch expansion in In-dia was associated with signi…cant reductions in rural poverty. In addition, household data demonstrate that, during the years of the social banking program, bank borrowing among rural manual labor households was higher in states which saw more rapid rural branch expansion. We also show that the program increased access of lower caste and tribal households to bank loans.
Taken together, these …ndings suggest that regulation of the Indian banking sector played a key role in directing bank credit towards the poor, and that easier access to bank credit and saving opportunities was associated with a signi…cant decline in rural poverty.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the features of the Indian social banking program relevant for our analysis. Section 3 summarizes the state level analysis, and Section 4 uses quinquennial household surveys, 1983-1999 , to examine the e¢ cacy of directed lending targets in increasing bank access for the poor. Section 5 concludes.
Program Description
The twenty years starting with the nationalization of the ten largest com- 
Household evidence
Our state-level analysis of the poverty impact of the social banking program does not answer the question of whether the program succeeded in increasing bank lending to the poor. 3 To examine this, we use data from quinquennial Indian NSS household surveys (employment/unemployment modules) in 1983 , 1987 , 1993 and 1999 (Burgess, Pande and Wong (2004 ). These surveys contain loan information for rural labor households. 4 Rural labor 2 The …rst stage regression for this IV procedure is column (1) For each surveyed rural labor household we know total debt outstanding, the source(s) of the debt and purpose(s) for which debt was acquired.
Across our four surveys, we …nd that roughly 33% of rural labor households in our sample are indebted. 23% of the debt of indebted households was from formal sources; banks (11%), cooperatives (8%), government (4%) and 72% from informal sources; moneylenders (22%), shopkeeper/trader (21%), relatives/friends (16%) and employer/landlord (13%).
Figures 3A and 3B graph, by survey round, results from nonparametric regressions of incidence of bank borrowing against real household expenditure per capita. In Figure 3A incidence of bank borrowing is measured as the probability of having a bank loan, and in Figure 3B by the share of total household debt coming from banks. In both cases we observe, for each year, a non-linear relationship between household expenditure and incidence of bank borrowing. Households below the poverty line are less likely to obtain bank loans than those above. The likelihood of having a bank loan is banking activities of non-labor households.
increasing with expenditure among the relatively poor and decreasing with expenditure among the relatively rich. Most striking is the relatively constant incidence of bank borrowing among the middle class in our sample.
A possible explanation is that directed lending targets implied that middle income rural labor households were equally eligible for bank loans. To further probe the impact of the social banking program on household borrowing we turn to a regression analysis. We estimate probit regressions of the form
where Y ijt is a dummy for whether household i in state j in year t has at least one outstanding loan, and X ijt a vector of household characteristics. initial …nancial development and households'ability to borrow from banks became uncorrelated.
The regressions in Table 2 
Conclusion
The Indian social banking program was amongst the largest state-led credit programs ever attempted in a low income country. This paper combines state and household data to o¤er some simple insights into the Indian social banking program's impact on economic outcomes and household borrowing behavior. State level analysis for the period 1961-2000 demonstrates that rural branch expansion in India signi…cantly lowered rural poverty. Household analysis shows that rural labor households, especially SC/ST households, were much less likely to obtain bank loans once the emphasis on social banking was reduced.
Arguably, the key elements of the social banking program which contributed to its success in reaching the poor were the expansion of the rural branch network and directed lending towards weaker sections in Indian society. However, it is important to end with a word of caution. To achieve this Marginal coefficients reported. Robust standard errors clustered by village are in parenthesis. Household demographics include household size, male adult and children shares in household, and age of household head (in levels and quadratic). * indicates significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1%. This graph displays results from locally weighted, non-parametric regressions of a bank loan dummy on real per capita monthly household expenditure for all rural labour households with household heads aged 25-80 by year. The bottom and top 1 percent of the per capita household expenditure distribution in the full sample of rural households are excluded from the sample. 1983 1987 1993 1999 This graph displays results from locally weighted, non-parametric regressions of the share of bank borrowing in total borrowing on real per capita monthly household expenditure for all indebted rural labour households with household heads aged 25-80 by year. The bottom and top 1 percent of the per capita household expenditure distribution in the full sample of rural households are excluded from the sample. Solid line represents the marginal differences due to SC/ST status in the probability of having a bank loan by year, obtained from Probit regressions of a bank loan dummy on SC/ST-year interactions. Dotted lines describe the 95% confidence interval. Other controls in the Probit regressions are as in Table 2 . 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 Solid line represents the marginal differences due to SC/ST status in the probability of having a loan from the informal sector by year, obtained from Probit regressions of an informal loan dummy on SC/ST-year interactions. Dotted lines describe the 95% confidence interval. Other controls in the Probit regressions are as in Table 2 .
